

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 234965

64

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66610

DRAFTED BY: S/S:FVORTIZ:GK

APPROVED BY: S/S:ORTIZ

----- 099921

R 021944Z OCT 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL LUANDA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

S E C R E T STATE 234965

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LISBON 5807 ACTION SECSTATE 02 OCT

QUOTE

S E C R E T LISBON 5807

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS ROUTINE INFO AMCONSUL LUANDA AND AMEMBASSY
KINSHASA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EAID, SREF, PO, AO

SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA -- AIRLIFT

REF: STATE 233665

1. MET WITH FONMIN MELO ANTUNES AT 1:00 P.M. OCTOBER 2 AND
SOUGHT ASSURANCES ON POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL. MELO ANTUNES'S
RESPONSES FOLLOW.

2. ANTUNES CONFIRMED THAT GOP POLICY WAS TO DEAL IMPARTIALLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 234965

WITH ALL THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TO REFRAIN FROM

ASSISTING MPLA IN ANY WAY IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST OTHER TWO MOVEMENTS. SAID HE JUST YESTERDAY HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM THIS POLICY TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF UNITA.

3. IN ELABORATION, ANTUNES SAID GOP INTENDED TO ADHERE TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ALVOR AGREEMENT. HE USED THE TERM "SPIRIT" BECAUSE ALVOR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS ELECTIONS. HOWEVER THE ESSENTIAL POINT OF GOP NEUTRALITY TOWARDS THE THREE MOVEMENTS REMAINED VALID. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WAS TO FIND A FORMULA TO TRANSFER POWER TO A COALITION OF THE THREE MOVEMENTS.

4. IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SUCH A FORMULA, GOP HAD SENT A DELEGATION TO KAMPALA AND HAD DESPATCHED VITOR CRESPO TO MOZAMBIQUE (ANTUNES SAID HE HAD INTENDED TO GO HIMSELF BUT WAS TOTALLY CONSUMED BY THE DOMESTIC CRISIS). CRESPO WOULD MEET NOT ONLY WITH MOZAMBIKAN LEADERS BUT ALSO WITH NYERERE AND KAUNDA "IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A FORMULA IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR POSITION." ANTUNES SAID GOP RECOGNIZES THAT SAMORA MICHEL SUPPORTS MPLA BUT BELIEVES THAT NYERERE AND KAUNDA MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO BE MORE HELPFUL.

5. IN SUMMARY MELO ANTUNES SAID THAT PORTUGUESE POLICY WAS "PRECISELY IN ACCORD" WITH THE FIRST POINT I HAD MADE. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE THREE MOVEMENTS.

6. FOLLOWING MY EXPOSITION OF OUR SECOND POINT, MELO ANTUNES COMMENTED THAT THERE ARE ALWAYS LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSPORTING EQUIPMENT. GOP HAD RUN ACROSS THIS PROBLEM IN MOZAMBIQUE AND HAD AGREED TO LEAVE BEHIND EQUIPMENT THAT WAS NOT NEEDED IN METROPOLE. THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS MORE COMPLICATED BECAUSE GOP EFFORTS TO FORM A NATIONAL ARMY HAD NOT MET WITH SUCCESS.

7. WHILE GOP HAD NOT DEVELOPED A FORMAL POSITION WITH REGARD TO EQUIPMENT, SUCH A POSITPON WOULD SURELY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL GOP POLICY. THAT IS, GOP WOULD NOT AID ANY MOVEMENT. HENCE IT WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EPACUATE ALL EQUIPMENT AND, FAILING THAT, TO AVOID GIVING ANYTHING TO ANY ONE MOVEMENT. THIS INCLUDED ALL THE EQUIPMENT I HAD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 234965

MENTIONED. WHILE HE WAS SURE OF HIS RESPONSE, ANTUNES WAS OBLIGED TO CONSIDER IT A PRELIMINARY REPLY SINCE THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN FULLY DEBATED WITHIN GOP. HE WOULD PURSUE IT.

8. HON OUR THIRD POINT, ANTUNES SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD ALWAYS DEFENDED THE PRESENCE OF PORTUGUESE TROOPS IN ANGOLA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND HIS POSITION HAD PREVAILED IN THE ALVOR AGREEMENT. HOWEVER THE MILITARY WERE

BECOMING MORE AND MORE RELUCTANT TO STAY IN ANGOLA. THE LAST POSITION THAT ANTUNES HAD TAKEN WAS THAT PORTUGUESE TROOPS SHOULD STAY AS LONG AS THERE ARE REFUGEES IN ANGOLA. ANTUNES SAID THAT "AT THIS MOMENT I DOUBT I WILL PREVAIL. HOWEVER I WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT FOR THE RETENTION OF TROOPS AFTER INDEPENDENCE." ANTUNES SAID HE WOULD DO THIS NOT ONLY FOR REASONS OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM, WHICH WERE OF INTEREST TO USG, BUT ALSO FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PORTUGUESE. HIS GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT PORTUGUESE TROOPS SHOULD STAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS SUCH AS LUANDA AND LOBITO.

9. COMMENT: IT SEEMS TO ME MELO ANTUNES HAS GIVEN US IN COMPLETE FRANKNESS EVERY COMMITMENT HE POSSIBLY CAN WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO MISLEAD US ON THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THIS IS A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS STILL STRUGGLING TO GET ITS TROOPS TO OCCUPY RADIO STUDIOS IN ITS CAPITAL. TO EXPECT THEIR WRIT TO EXTEND TO FAR OFF ANGOLA IN THE WANING DAYS OF THEIR HEGEMONY IS UNREALISTIC.

WE CAN DOUBT THEIR CAPACITY BUT WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE GOP'S SERIOUSNESS AS DID KINSHASA'S 8558. THE PRESENT GOP OVERTHREW THE GOVERNMENT WHICH FAVORED THE MPLA. AZEVEDO IS NOW GAMBLING ALL ON A FIRM ANTI-COMMUNIST EFFORT AND MELO ANTUNES STOOD UP TO COMMUNISTS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS DANGEROUS TO DO SO. WE HAD ENOUGH FAITH IN THE MELO ANTUNES GROUP THEN TO PROMISE UNSTINTING SUPPORT. I SEE NO REASON TO ALTER OUR APPROACH NOW THAT THEY ARE IN POWER. TO THE CONTRARY, THEY NEED AND EXPECT OUR BACKING MORE THAN EVER IF THEY ARE TO SUCCEED, AND EVERY RETURNING ANGOLAN REFUGEE WILL BE A HELP IN THE LISBON STREET STRUGGLE WHICH IS THREATENING.

MY ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION TO DOUBLE THE AIRLIFT WAS MADE ON SEPTEMBER 9. I RETURNED FROM CONSULTATION WITH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 234965

INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK CERTAIN COMMITMENTS FROM THE GOP. THESE WERE REPORTED IN LISBON 5542 OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND LISBON 5546 OF SEPTEMBER 20. SUBSEQUENTLY WE LEARNED OF MOBUTU'S OPINIONS OF PORTUGUESE ACTIVITIES BUT OUR CONSUL IN LUANDA HAS CONFIRMED THAT GOP IS DOING ITS BEST TO FOLLOW A POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. ON OCTOBER 1 I RECEIVED A SET OF ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS TO ATTACH TO THE AIRLIFT.

GOP HAS NOW RESPONDED AS BEST IT CAN TO THESE CONDITIONS, BUT ONLY FIVE WEEKS REMAIN BEFORE NOVEMBER 11. IF WE CANNOT TELL THEM IMMEDIATELY THAT WE WILL INCREASE THE AIRLIFT, I RECOMMEND WE GIVE THEM A DEFINITE NO. THIS WILL MEAN REJECTING THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT'S FIRST REQUEST TO US AT A TIME WHEN IT IS LOCKED IN A DECISIVE STRUGGLE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. BUT OUTRIGHT REJECTION IS BETTER THAN CONTINUED DELAY BY THE USG. SUCH DELAY IMPEDES GOP

PLANNING FOR THE REFUGEES, FEEDS CHARGES OF BLACKMAIL, AND
RUNS US UP AGAINST THE NOVEMBER 11 DEADLINE.
CARLUCCI
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY EQUIPMENT, POLICIES, CAT-C, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, LIBERATION FRONTS, MILITARY AIRLIFTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: buchantr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE234965
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S:FVORTIZ:GK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: N750005-0031
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751091/aaaadden.tel
Line Count: 173
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 75 STATE 233665
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchantr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 JUN 2003 by WorrelSW>; APPROVED <21 OCT 2003 by buchantr>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PORTUGUESE POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA -- AIRLIFT
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, SREF, PO, AO, US, (ANTUNES, MELO)
To: LUANDA KINSHASA
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006